TRUMP v CASA – Universal Injunctions

TRUMP v CASA – Universal Injunctions

Today, the United States Supreme Court ruled that universal injunctions are no longer to be used by District Courts to bind the entire nation in cases where the Constitutional rights of specific Plaintiffs are at issue. This comes as the debate over these injections has reached a fever pitch in the first 200 days of Trump’s second administration, and amidst the issuance of 25 universal injunctions to block actions taken by the new administration.

Since the founding of this nation, there has been an ever-changing debate on the separation and balance of powers between the three branches of government. In recent years, the issue of whether single Federal District Courts’ rulings can bind the entire nation via universal injunctions has become a hot button issue of political and constitutional debate. Today, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc., in order to provide more clarity on this issue. While this case has garnered national attention due to its roots in defining the nature of Birthright Citizenship, today’s opinion from the Court instead provides the final say over whether a single judge in a single district can change the judicial landscape for the 342 million people within the borders of the United States with a stroke of their pen – for now.

Universal injunctions—sometimes called “nationwide injunctions” – are court orders that prohibit the government from enforcing a law or policy against anyone, not just the parties to a particular lawsuit. The legal history of universal injunctions in the United States has been the subject of significant debate, with their origins, legitimacy, and frequency evolving over time.

At the time of the founding and throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, federal courts’ equitable authority was understood to be limited to remedies “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” in England. Suits in equity were brought by and against individual parties, and the Chancellor’s remedies were generally party-specific. Injunctions typically could not bind nonparties; as stated in early English and American sources, “you cannot have an injunction except against a party to the suit.”

Some forms of group litigation, such as “bills of peace,” allowed courts to adjudicate the rights of members of small, cohesive groups without formally joining them all to the lawsuit. However, these were not analogous to universal injunctions, as they were limited in scope and typically bound only the group represented in the action. Taxpayer suits in some state courts occasionally resulted in broad relief, but this practice did not become widespread until the mid-19th century and was not universally accepted.

For example, the Supreme Court, in cases such as Scott v. Donald (1897), permitted only party-specific relief, even when broader relief was requested. The Court consistently rebuffed requests for relief that extended beyond the parties, as seen in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. (1940) and Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F. 252 (1923).

Universal injunctions were not a feature of federal-court litigation until well into the 20th century. For most of the nation’s history, such remedies were “conspicuously nonexistent.” Even during periods of significant constitutional litigation, such as the Lochner Era and the New Deal, universal injunctions were not issued. The D.C. Circuit is credited with issuing what is regarded as the first universal injunction in Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co. (1963), which enjoined the Secretary of Labor “with respect to the entire [electric motors and generators] industry,” not just the named plaintiffs. However, there is some dispute about whether this was truly the first, with some scholars pointing to earlier cases such as West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette (1943), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan (1913) as possible examples. Regardless, universal injunctions postdated the founding by more than a century.

By the early 21st century, universal injunctions became more common, particularly in litigation challenging major federal policies. During the first 100 days of the second Trump administration, district courts issued approximately 25 universal injunctions.

The Supreme Court and legal scholars have increasingly questioned the legitimacy of universal injunctions. The Court has noted that such injunctions lack a historical pedigree in traditional equity practice and may exceed the equitable authority granted to federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789.

Today, the Supreme Court addressed the contentious issue of universal injunctions in the case of Trump v. CASA, Inc.. This case revolved around whether federal courts have the authority to universally enjoin the enforcement of executive or legislative policies. Universal injunctions, which prevent the government from enforcing a policy against anyone, not just the parties involved in a lawsuit, have been a growing point of debate in recent years. The Court’s majority opinion emphasized that universal injunctions lack historical precedent and are inconsistent with the traditional understanding of equitable remedies. Historically, courts have provided relief specific to the parties involved in a case, and the majority argued that expanding this to universal injunctions undermines the judicial system’s structure. The opinion highlighted concerns about forum shopping, where plaintiffs seek favorable jurisdictions to secure nationwide relief, and the asymmetry this creates allowing a single successful challenge to halt a policy nationwide while requiring the government to win in every jurisdiction to enforce it. The dissenting justices, however, raised significant concerns about the implications of the

majority’s decision. They argued that limiting courts’ ability to issue universal injunctions could lead to fragmented enforcement of federal laws, creating confusion and inequity. Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, warned that this decision could render constitutional protections meaningless for individuals not directly involved in litigation. Justice Jackson further emphasized that the ruling risks creating a “law-free zone” where the Executive could continue unconstitutional actions against those who have not yet sued, undermining the rule of law.

The case also delved into the historical evolution of universal injunctions, noting their emergence in the 20th century and their increased use in recent decades. While the majority viewed this as a deviation from traditional judicial practices, the dissent pointed to instances where courts have historically issued broad relief to address systemic issues.

Despite the general rule laid out by the Court that universal injunctions—injunctions that prohibit the government from enforcing a law or policy against anyone, not just the plaintiffs—”likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts,” and therefore are to be disfavored by the Judiciary, the Court did create some limited exceptions to the general rule.

The Court clarified that injunctions may be issued only to the extent “necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” The Court distinguished between “complete relief” (relief necessary to fully redress the plaintiffs’ injuries) and “universal relief” (relief that benefits all similarly situated persons, including nonparties). The Court stated that complete relief is the maximum a court can provide, not a guarantee, and that party-specific injunctions may incidentally benefit nonparties, but only as a byproduct of providing full relief to the plaintiffs.

Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that in rare cases, it may be “all but impossible for courts to craft relief that is complete and benefits only the named plaintiffs.” For example, in cases involving public nuisances or injuries that cannot be separated among affected parties, an indivisible remedy may be appropriate. However, such cases are described as “by far the exception.”

The Court also recognized that broad, class wide relief may still be available through properly certified class actions under USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 23. The Court emphasized that the “bill of peace” in historical equity is analogous to the modern class action, and that class wide relief is permissible when the requirements of USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 23 are met.

In this specific case, Trump v. CASA, the Court remanded to the lower courts to determine whether a narrower injunction would be sufficient to provide complete relief to the

plaintiffs, leaving open the possibility that, in some circumstances, a broader injunction may be justified if necessary for complete relief. Ultimately, the Court’s decision reflects a broader debate about the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive, as well as the role of courts in upholding constitutional rights. The ruling has significant implications for how federal policies are challenged and enforced, potentially reshaping the landscape of judicial remedies in the United States.